Leakage Resilient of Timing Side Channel Attack for Key Exchange Security Model
Clement Chan Zheng Wei1, Chuah Chai Wen2
1Clement Chan Zheng Wei, Information Security Interest Group, Faculty of Computer Science and Information Technology, University Tun Hussein Onn Malaysia, Malaysia.
2Chuah Chai Wen, Information Security Interest Group, Faculty of Computer Science and Information Technology, University Tun Hussein Onn Malaysia, Malaysia.
Manuscript received on 18 June 2019 | Revised Manuscript received on 25 June 2019 | Manuscript Published on 19 June 2019 | PP: 258-264 | Volume-8 Issue-8S June 2019 | Retrieval Number: H10430688S19/19©BEIESP
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© The Authors. Blue Eyes Intelligence Engineering and Sciences Publication (BEIESP). This is an open-access article under the CC-BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
Abstract: In leakage resilient cryptography, leakage resilient key exchange (KE) protocols are constructed to resist side channel leakage attack. Side channels attacks take place during the execution of the cryptographic schemes or protocols. For a KE protocols to stay secure, counter measures must be employed on the cryptographic primitives instantiated during the protocol building to counter side channel leakage attacks. This work propose a leakage resilient key derivation function (KDF) primitive to be instantiated on KE protocol. Then, this work proceed to define a security model to show the leakage resilient (KDF) is provably secure using indistinguishability game-hopping technique. Lastly, this work revisit the KE protocol proposed by Alawatugoda and construct an improved leakage resilient KE protocol by instantiating our proposed leakage resilient KDF.
Keywords: Key Exchange Protocol, Leakage Resilient Cryptography, Security Models, Timing Analysis Attack.
Scope of the Article: Cryptography and Applied Mathematics